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This document provides an overview of the facts and disposition of federal cases 
interpreting whether vessels are “public vessels” under U.S. admiralty law. This document 
is a supplement to Status of the U.S. Academic Research Fleet as Public Vessels under U.S. and 
International Law, which discusses these cases and other legal authorities relevant to a 
determination of whether U.S. academic research fleet vessels are public vessels. The cases 
in this document are arranged by circuit and type of court and are presented in reverse 
chronological order within each court. This document is to be used for research purposes 
only and is not legal advice. 
Supreme Court 
U.S. v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164 (1976). 
United Continental Tuna Corporation (“UCTC”), a Philippine corporation largely owned by 
Americans, owned a fishing vessel, MV Orient, which was involved in a collision with a U.S. 
Navy destroyer. The MV Orient later sank due to the damage from the collision.1 UCTC sued 
the United States for damages sustained from the sinking of its vessel.2  
The issue posed to the Supreme Court was to determine Congress’s intention when it 
deleted the phrase “employed as a merchant vessel” from the SAA in 1960 and whether the 
deletion affected restrictions on liability under the PVA.3 Congress enacted the PVA to 
allow liability in cases involving public vessels, including claims by foreign entities where 
the foreign country allows such suits in its own courts.4 The Court determined that deletion 
of the “employed as a merchant vessel” from the SAA did not extend liability in cases 
involving a public vessel and a foreign entity where there was no reciprocity. The Court 
                                                                    
1 425 U.S. 164, 165-66 (1976). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 659. 
4 Id. at 660. 
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held that “claims within the scope of the [PVA] remain subject to its terms after the 1960 
amendment to the [SAA].”5  
Calmar S.S. Corp. v. United States, 345 U.S. 446 (1953) 
Calmar S.S. Corp. owned the SS Portmar and operated it under a charter agreement with the 
United States.6 The SS Portmar was lost as a result of war bombing.7 The Court held that 
under the SAA, a privately owned vessel operated under the command of its owner was a 
merchant vessel despite carrying war-related cargo, and therefore was not covered by the 
SAA prior to the 1960 amendments. The charter agreement provided that the owner was 
responsible for all of the ship maintenance and operations,8 and the nature of the cargo did 
not factor into determining whether the SS Portmar was a public vessel.9 The Supreme 
Court held that the SS Portmar was “employed as a merchant vessel” even though it was 
“operated for the government.”10  
First Circuit 
Smith v. MAR, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 62 (D.R.I. 1994). 
Stephen Smith served as a chief engineer on the TWR-841. He sustained injuries and sought 
recovery via the Jones Act and under general maritime law.11 The TWR-841 was owned by 
the United States Navy and operated by MAR; MAR employed Smith.12 The contract 
between the United States and MAR provided “the contractor shall perform . . . . operation 
and maintenance of vessels and service craft which support the [Naval Underwater 
Systems Center] and other RDT&E projects.”13 The court held TWR-841 was owned by the 
United States and used to support naval projects.14 The court’s holding is consistent with 
the definition provided by the PVA, which stipulates that “a public vessel is one that is 
owned by the government and used for a public purpose by a private party.”15  
                                                                    
5 Id. at 666.   
6 345 U.S. 446, 447-48 (1953). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 451-452. 
9 Id. at 455. 
10 Id. at 456. 
11 877 F. Supp. 62, 63 (D. R.I. 1994). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 65. 
14 Id. 
15 46 U.S.C. §§ 30901-30909. 
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Second Circuit 
Blanco v. United States, 775 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1985). 
Blanco filed a wrongful death action on behalf of his father who served as a seaman on the 
Sealift Atlantic.16 Blanco’s father became mentally unstable during his service on the Sealift 
Atlantic and was admitted to the hospital on the vessel. Due to inadequate supervision, 
Blanco’s father was able to leave the hospital and fell overboard.17  
Sealift Atlantic was one of nine Sealift-class tankers18 privately owned by Marine Transport 
Lines, Inc. (MTL) and under bareboat charter to the United States for a five year term, with 
renewal options.19 The vessels operated under the direction of the Department of the Navy; 
crew was hired by MTL under the direction of the Navy. The court held that the Sealift 
Atlantic was a public vessel because the bareboat charter agreement with the Navy made 
the Sealift Atlantic effectively a “vessel in the naval service.”20 “Vessel in the naval service” 
is defined by statute as “any vessel of the Navy, manned by the Navy or chartered on 
bareboat charter to the Navy.”21 
Padro v. Vessel Charters, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).  
Vessel Charters, Inc. (“VCI”), a private company, entered into a time-charter agreement 
with the United States Navy (“USN”) for SS Santa Adela, owned by VCI. The time-charter 
agreement stipulated that the manning of the vessel with crew, navigation, care and 
custody of the vessel and daily operations remained with VCI.22 USN’s responsibility fell to 
designating what cargo the vessel would carry and what ports were to be visited.23 In April 
1988, Gumersindo Padro, an employee of VCI, became injured when one of the mooring 
lines snapped and wrapped around his leg, resulting in a severe fracture of his leg. Padro 
initiated suit against VCI for his injuries under the SAA.24  
The court held that the SS Santa Adela was a public vessel because the vessel was “operated 
by or for the United States.”25 The Padro court utilized the J.W. Petersen court’s analysis 
(infra) regarding this issue, which provided that a “reasonable interpretation for the plain 
                                                                    
16 775 F.2d 53, 54 (2d Cir. 1985). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 55. 
19 Id. at 54, 56. 
20 Id. at 58-59. 
21 775 F.2d at 59, quoting 10 U.S.C. § 7721(b)(1). 
22 731 F. Supp. 145, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
23 Id. at 146. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 147. 
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language of the statute requires application to a privately-owned ship operated for the 
benefit of the United States.”26 The court looked at the time-charter agreement provisions 
between VCI and USN to determine whether the private ship owner was immune from 
maritime liability due to the SAA’s exclusivity provision.27 Articles 22(a) and 31 of the time-
charter agreement between VCI and USN indicate that “VCI retained liability for the 
negligence of its crew and the unseaworthiness of the SS SANTA ADELA.”28 As a result, the 
court held that VCI was subject to liability and the exclusivity provision did not apply. 
Geo. W. Rogers Constr. Corp. v. U.S., 118 F. Supp. 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). 
The Cayuse collided with Whirley No. 32; Whirley then struck a bridge.29 At the time of the 
collision, the Cayuse was owned by the United States and operated through its agent, 
Keystone Shipping Company, according to a service agreement.30 The court held the Cayuse 
was a public vessel because it was owned and operated by the United States, and it was 
carrying cargo for the United States Navy.31  
Roeper v. U.S., 85 F. Supp. 864 (E.D.N.Y. 1949). 
Roeper was injured while aboard the SS Carl Schurz, which was a converted troop 
transport.32 Roeper was injured during passage through a troop bunk area on his way to 
his assigned civilian bunk, and sued for compensation due to lost employment.33 The court 
held the vessel was a public vessel under the PVA because it was carrying soldiers and 
military supplies.34  
Third Circuit 
Petition of United States, 367 F.2d 505 (3d Cir. 1966). 
Mathiasen, a private corporation, was under a contractual agreement with the United 
States Navy to operate Mission San Francisco, an undocumented tanker owned by the 
United States, when the vessel collided with the Elna II, resulting in numerous deaths and 
personal injury claims.35 Mathiasen supplied a crew and operational equipment for the 
                                                                    
26 Id.  
27 Id. at 148.  
28 Id. at 148. 
29 118 F. Supp. 927, 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 934. 
32 85 F. Supp. 864, 867 (E.D.N.Y. 1949). 
33 Id. at 867. 
34 Id. at 866. 
35 In re Tiedemann, 367 F.2d 498 (3d Cir. 1966), supp. op. 367 F.2d 505, 507-08 (3d Cir. 1966).  
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Mission San Francisco which was to be used only for governmental business, i.e., delivering 
cargo for the Navy.36  
In this supplementary opinion on the case, the court held the Mission San Francisco was a 
public vessel because “government ownership and use as directed by the government 
exclusively for a public purpose suffice without more to make a ship a public vessel.”37 The 
court utilized the Restatement (Second) of Agency to hold that Mathiasen was an agent of 
the United States:38 “[A]gent of the United States is an appropriate characterization of such 
a contract operator of a public vessel as Mathiasen . . . . it is arguable that Mathiasen’s day 
to day working of the ship was not subject to government control.”39 The government 
determined destinations and what cargo the Mission San Francisco would carry; manning, 
navigating, food provisions and operation was the responsibility of Mathiasen.40  
Fifth Circuit 
Williams v. Central Gulf Lines, 874 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1989). 
Central Gulf Lines (“CGL”) employed Ballard Williams (“Williams”) as a seaman on the S/S 
Bay, which was owned by CGL and time-chartered to the United States Navy.41 Williams fell 
ill and died while in service on the vessel, and his estate brought suit against CGL.42 The 
court reviewed the time-charter agreement to determine whether CGL was liable or 
immune because the S/S Bay was a public vessel. The court found that Article 22 of the 
time-charter agreement provided that CGL’s responsibility was to man the vessel, navigate 
the vessel, take care and custody of the vessel and care of the cargo (these are considered 
day-to-day operations).43 USN’s responsibility was to provide destinations and the cargo.44 
Article 31 provided that CGL “retain[ed] complete and exclusive possess and control of the 
vessel and its navigation.”45  
The court instituted a two-part inquiry which would provide if Williams had a remedy 
under the SAA. The first prong provides a “jurisdictional hook” – “in view of the 1960 
amendment [of the SAA], if a proceeding in admiralty could be asserted against a private 
person in the Government’s position, then the [SAA] will provide a jurisdictional hook on 
                                                                    
36 367 F.2d 505, 508 (3d Cir. 1966). 
37 376 F.2d at 509. 
38 RESTATEMENT (AGENCY) 2d §§ 2, 14. 
39 Id.   
40 376 F.2d at 509-510. 
41 Id. 
42 874 F.2d 1058, 1059 (5th Cir. 1989). 
43 874 F.2d at 1060. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
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which to hang a claim against the Government.”46 Here, the court concluded the USN 
consented to suit as if it were a private person.47 The second prong determines whether the 
claim satisfies the “traditional admiralty claim.”48 The court’s general rule is that a “time 
charterer ‘who has no control over the vessel, assumes no liability for negligence of the 
crew or unseaworthiness of the vessel absent a showing that the parties to the charter 
intended otherwise.”49 Here, the court determined the USN failed this prong because the 
charter specifically provided that the USN acquired no operational control. As such, even 
though the charter provides that the USN “shall bear certain costs, responsibility for costs 
‘in and of itself does not transfer operational responsibility from the owner.’”50 In 
conclusion, the court found because both prongs were not met, the exclusivity provision in 
the SAA does not exclude CGL from liability.51  
Trautman v. Buck Steber, Inc., 692 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1982). 
Trautman appealed from a district court decision finding the United States not liable for 
Trautman’s injuries because the United States did not assert operational control over the 
barge on which Trautman worked, nor was the barge “operated by or for” the United States 
within the scope of the Suits in Admiralty Act.52  
Trautman served as a salvage diver employed by Buck Steber, Inc. (Steber), which was 
subcontracted by Murphy Marine Salvage Company (Murphy) in 1974 to clear the Suez 
Canal of sunken vessels. This agreement stemmed from a written agreement between the 
United States and Egypt after the 1967 war between Egypt and Israel.53 The agreement 
between the United States and Murphy provided for the use of two Yard Heavy Lift Craft 
(YHLC) that were owned by the United States.54 Per the agreement, Murphy was 
responsible for manned and operating the YHLC.55 Murphy contracted with Steber for the 
necessary diving services in order to retrieve the sunken vessels. The United States was not 
involved in this agreement, nor was it involved in day to day activities on the craft.56 
                                                                    
46 874 F.2d at 1062. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. The term “control” used by the 5th Circuit refers to the operational control of the vessel, not the ultimate 
control of its destination or cargoes. 874 F.2d at 1062. 
50 874 F.2d at 1063. 
51 Id. 
52 692 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1982). 
53 Id. at 441-442. 
54 Id. at 442. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
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Effectively, the diving barges utilized by Steber were acquired by Murphy from the Suez 
Canal Authority.57  
The court affirmed the district court decision that the United States did not assert 
operational control over the diving barge, and thus that liability to the United States did not 
attach via the SAA.58 “[C]ontrol by the United States is the crucial element in determining 
whether a case falls within the jurisdiction of the SAA.”59 Additionally, the court held that 
Steber was not an agent of the United States because the United States’ only role was to 
monitor progress of the salvage of the sunken vessel.60 The United States was not placed 
under a duty to determine whether the safe diving procedures utilized by Steber were 
practiced.61 The contract renegotiation that took place between Murphy and the United 
States only impacted the work to be done on the sunken vessel; in no way did the 
renegotiation assert that Steber was an agent of the United States.62 The court upheld the 
district court’s ruling that the United States was not liable for Trautman’s injuries and that 
the United States did not “operate” the diving barge, respectively.63  
Doyle v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 504 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1974). 
Bethlehem Steel Corporation (“BSC”) employed Alivn Doyle as a shipyard worker. He was 
injured while working on the USNS Yukon,64 a federally-owned vessel operated by the 
Military Sea Transportation Service of the Department of the Navy through a contract with 
Mathiasen’s Tanker Industries (“MTI”).65 MTI conducted and managed the business of the 
Navy tanker on behalf of the United States government.66 The court determined that the 
USNS Yukon was a public vessel because it was owned by the United States Navy and that 
Mathiasen operated USNS Yukon for the United States Navy, making Mathiasen an agent of 
the United States.67  
Tarver v. U.S., 785 F. Supp. 607 (S.D. Miss. 1991). 
Anthony Tarver was an employee of Pan Am as a seaman aboard the M/V Clermont II, a 
barge owned by the United States.68 The United States contracted with Pan Am to operate 
                                                                    
57 692 F.2d at 443. 
58 Id. at 443-44. 
59 Id. at 444. 
60 Id. at 445-46. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 692 F.2d at 446. 
64 504 F.2d 911, 912 (5th Cir. 1974). 
65 Id. at 912. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 913-14. 
68 785 F. Supp. 607, 609 (S.D. Miss. 1991). 
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the M/V Clermont II to transport rocket fuel between various sites of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration located in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi.69 Under this 
contract, Pan Am was to provide the operational aspects of the project, including providing 
a crew for the barge.70 Tarver was on the M/V Clermont II when he sustained his injuries.71  
The court found no question that M/V Clermont II was a public vessel within the purview of 
the Public Vessels Act because it was used for the sole benefit of the Space Center.72 In 
addition, the court found that Pan Am was the agent of the United States because “[i]n 
operating the M/V Clermont II, Pan Am agreed to act in accordance with the direction and 
orders issued by the United States . . . . the vessel’s business was to be conducted solely for 
the United States, in accordance with directions, orders and regulations as promulgated by 
the United States.”73  
Stubblefield v. Vickers Towing Co., 674 F. Supp. 566 (N.D. Miss. 1987). 
Thomas Stubblefield was a seaman employed by Vickers Towing as a member of the crew 
of the M/V Terri.74 Stubblefield sought recovery under the Jones Act and general maritime 
law for injuries he sustained while aboard the M/V Terri. The M/V Terri was one of two 
vessels time chartered to the Department of the Army by Vickers Towing.75 The charter 
agreement stipulated Army was to use the vessels, including the M/V Terri, for construction 
and maintenance of channel improvement works.76  
The PVA provides that a public vessel includes a vessel owned by the government and used 
for a public purpose by a private party.77 Here, the court held that the M/V Terri was not a 
public vessel because Vickers Towing, a private company, owned and operated the vessels 
and the Army used the vessel under a time charter agreement.78 However, the court 
determined that the vessel was “operated by or for the United States” under the SAA, and 
therefore that Stubblefield could recover exclusively against the United States and not 
against Vickers Towing.79 “The element of control necessary to create liability in the United 
States is not detailed supervision of the minutia of the vessel’s operations but rather a 
shifting of financial risk by assigning the ability to exclusively control when the vessel will 
                                                                    
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id.   
72 785 F. Supp. at 611. 
73 Id. at 612. 
74 674 F. Supp. 566, 567 (N.D. Miss. 1987). 
75 Id. at 568. 
76 Id. 
77 46 U.S.C. § 30901. 
78 674 F. Supp. at 568. 
79 Id. 
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sail. . . .”80 Here, the United States controlled the M/V Terri under the charter because the 
charter agreement provided that the Army maintained the operation of the crew and 
vessel.81  
Santos v. RCA Serv. Co., 603 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. La. 1985). 
Manuel Santos sought recovery for injuries he sustained while employed by RCA Service 
Company as a seaman and crew member on a group of military support vessels.82 At the 
time of his injuries, RCA was under contract with the United States Navy to provide support 
for testing and evaluation of weapons.83 The United States Navy owned all but one of the 
support vessels operated by RCA; the other vessel was owned by RCA but leased to the 
Navy for the duration of the exercises.84 The contract terms for the Navy-owned ships 
stipulated that RCA “mans, operates, maintains and repairs the group of support vessels.”85  
The Santos court applied the PVA and held that “the support vessels operated by RCA on 
which Santos claims to have been injured were public vessels within the meaning of the 
Public Vessels Act.”86 “In this case the primary function of the vessels was to launch targets 
for Naval ships to fire upon, and then to retrieve the targets. For such activity to be 
successful, direction of the vessel's overall function by the Navy would be necessary.”87  
Trautman v. Buck Steber, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 171 (E.D. La. 1981). 
The facts of the case are identical to those discussed for the appeal of this case (supra). At 
the district court, Trautman alleged the diving barge on which he was injured was 
“operated by or for” the United States, and he therefore sought remedy under the SAA. The 
court held that “[t]he only connection the United States had with the vessel was to assist 
through the efforts . . . . in having the Suez Canal Authority make the vessel available to 
Murphy, and its subcontractor Steber. The United States at no time exercised any authority 
or control over the use.”88  
Additionally, the court held that Trautman failed to show that the United States caused or 
allowed unsafe diving practices which were the cause of Trautman’s injuries.89 “All the 
evidence showed that the United States exercised no operational control over the work of 
                                                                    
80 Id. at 569. 
81 Id. at 569-570. 
82 603 F. Supp. 943, 944 (E.D. La. 1985). 
83 Id. at 945. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 946. 
87 603 F. Supp. at 947. 
88  513 F. Supp. 171, 178 (E.D. La. 1981). 
89 Id. 
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Murphy or Steber personnel.”90 Any unsafe diving practices were attributed to Steber’s 
negligence. As a result, the district court dismissed Trautman’s complaint against the 
United States.91  
Saffrhan v. Buck Steber, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. La. 1977). 
Raymond Saffrhan was a diver employed by Buck Steber (“Steber”) to clear sunken vessels 
in the Suez Canal from two Yard Heavy Lift Craft (“YHLC”) provided by the United States to 
Murphy Pacific Marine Salvage Co. (“Murphy”).92 The YHLCs were manned and operated by 
Murphy, which subcontracted with Steber for diving services.93 Saffrhan was injured 
during an operation to raise an anchor under the direction of the U.S. Navy Captain in 
charge of the military personnel for the project.94 To determine which remedies and parties 
were applicable to Saffrhan’s suit, the court reviewed whether Murphy and Steber were 
agents of the United States. The court held that “when a public vessel is operated by a 
private corporation under contract with the United States, the private operator becomes 
the agent of the United States.”95 As a result, the United States was liable for Saffrhan’s 
injury. 
Seventh Circuit 
J.W. Petersen Coal & Oil Co. v. U.S., 323 F. Supp. 1198 (N.D. Ill. 1970). 
J.W. Petersen Coal & Oil Co (“Petersen”) owned real estate along and under the North 
Branch Canal of the Chicago River; Petersen built and maintained a wooden dock for coal 
transportation.96 In June 1966, Dunbar & Sullivan Dredging Company (“Dunbar”) was 
awarded a contract by the United States Army Corps of Engineers for dredging operations 
in the Chicago River and North Branch Canal.97 Petersen brought suit against the United 
States and Dunbar under the SAA, alleging the dredging operations caused soil under the 
dock to move, resulting in damage to the entire dock.98 The court held that “extensive 
operation or direction of the vessel by government personnel would be required to make 
the vessel operated ‘by the United States’ and something closer to a time charter where the 
Government directs the vessel’s overall functions even though the owner may control the 
operation of the vessel’s personnel and equipment rather than a single purpose contract 
                                                                    
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 179. 
92 433 F. Supp. 129, 130 (E.D. La. 1977). 
93 Id. at 130. 
94 Id. at 130-31. 
95 Id. at 133. 
96 323 F. Supp. 1198, 1200 (N.D. Ill. 1970). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 1200, 1205. 
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entered into with an independent contractor would be required to make the vessel 
‘operated for the United States.’”99  
Ninth Circuit 
Dearborn v. Mar Ship Op., 113 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 1997). 
Dearborn sought recovery for injuries sustained while employed as a seaman by Bay Ship 
on the United States Naval Ship Kane.100 At the time of Dearborn’s injuries, the Kane was 
owned by the United States Navy, but chartered to Bay Ship under a charter agreement 
titled “Performance Work Statement-Military Sealift Command-Special Mission 
Oceanographic and Hydrographic Survey Ships.”101  
The court needed to determine whether Bay Ship was an agent of the United States. For 
analysis, the court looked to the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1(1) and to Petition of 
United States (supra).102 It found that two characteristics appear most often to be 
dispositive under the opinions that have directly confronted the question of whether a 
private entity under contract with the United States to operate a public vessel is an agent of 
the United States: in order to find that a character is an agent of the United States, 1) the 
United States must exercise significant control over the charterer’s activities – either day to 
day control or overall control and direction of the mission, and 2) the charterer must be 
engaged in conducting the business of the United States.103  
Bay Ship operated the Kane on the government’s behalf and subject to the government’s 
overall control per the charter agreement.104 In addition, the Kane was specifically utilized 
to “support the Navy’s oceanographic survey programs which are conducted by [Naval 
Oceanographic Office] personnel aboard ship.”105 The court therefore held that Bay Ship 
was an agent of the United States: “Bay ship was employed to operate the Kane in the 
business of the United States, and, although it did not reserve the right to hire or fire 
individual crew members, the United States retained significant overall direction and 
control over the operation of the vessel.”106  
                                                                    
99 Id. at 1205-1206. 
100 113 F.3d 995, 996 (9th Cir. 1997). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 997, citing Petition of U.S., 367 F.2d 505 (3d Cir. 1966). 
103 Id. at 997-998. 
104 Id. 
105 113 F.3d at 998. 
106 Id. at 998-99. 
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Port of Portland v. Water Quality Ins. Syndicate, 796 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1986). 
The Port of Portland (Port) brought an action against St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance 
Company and the Water Quality Insurance Syndicate, two of the Port’s insurance 
carriers.107 The Oregon, the Port’s dredge, sank at its mooring in the Port’s harbor.108 The 
court determined the Oregon was not a public vessel because even though the dredging 
tasks were completed under contract with the Army Corps of Engineers, “a city’s dredging 
operations have been held not to be a ‘governmental function.’”109 Under Oregon state law, 
the Port was authorized to “engage in certain commercial activities,” such as dredging.110  
The court also considered the public policy purpose of the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act of 1982, which excludes public vessels from liability unless they are “engaged in 
commerce.”111 The Act does not define “engaged in commerce,”112 but the court determined 
that dredging is commercial activity within the meaning of the statute. 
Nelsen v. Research Corporation of the University of Hawaii, 805 F. Supp. 837 (D. Haw. 1992). 
The facts in this case are identical to the prior decision in the same litigation. In this 
holding, the court surfaced the agency issue briefly discussed in prior litigation.113 The 
Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA) provides an exclusive remedy when an action is “against an 
agent or employee of the United States or of any incorporated or incorporated agency 
thereof whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.”114 Here, “the agency relationship 
between the United States Navy and RCUH is their bareboat charter agreement, which must 
be reviewed to determine what extent, if any, (1) the government consented to allow RCUH 
to act on its behalf and (2) RCUH was subject to the government’s control.”115 The court 
found that the charter agreement between the United States and RCUH “required RCUH to 
maintain the Kila in good repair, maintain liability insurance on the vessel and hold the 
United States harmless from third party claims,”116 but the Government did not consent to 
allow RCUH to act on its behalf. The Kila was not operated for the United States or subject 
to its control. No one outside of the University of Hawaii ever gave directions or orders 
concerning either the day-to-day or overall operation, maintenance, or manning of the Kila. 
If anyone wished to use the vessel, they had to get permission from RCUH, not the United 
                                                                    
107 796 F.2d 1188, 1190 (9th Cir. 1986). 
108 Id. at 1190. 
109 Id. at 1191. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 796 F.2d at 1191. 
113 See Nelsen v. Research Corp of University of Hawaii, 752 F. Supp. 350, 356 (D. Haw. 1990). 
114 805 F. Supp. 837, 846 (D. Haw. 1992).  
115 Id. at 847. 
116 Id. at 847. 
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States. Looking at both the agreement and the venture as a whole, the court therefore held 
that RCUH was not an agent of the United States.117  
Nelsen v. Research Corporation of the University of Hawaii, 752 F. Supp. 350 (D. Haw., 1990). 
Captain Robert Nelsen of the Kila, an oceanographic research vessel owned by the United 
States Navy but bareboat chartered to the Research Corporation of the University of Hawaii 
(“RCUH”), sued RCUH to recover damages as a result of suffering emotional and 
psychological injuries brought on by the University of Hawaii’s alleged negligent 
maintenance of the Kila.118 Nelsen sought recovery under the Jones Act and the Public 
Vessels Act (“PVA”).119  
The court held that the Kila was a public vessel owned by the United States because the 
United States Navy owned the Kila and the University of Hawaii had restricted use of the 
vessel, i.e., “performance of oceanographic research for the Government,” per the charter 
agreement.120  While the court did not completely address the agency issue, the court 
touched on agency by stating “a contract operator of a public vessel owned by the United 
States may be an ‘agent’, even though its day to day operation of the vessel is not subject to 
government control.”121  
Eleventh Circuit 
Uralde v. United States, 614 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2010). 
Augustin Uralde, his wife, and several other Cuban nationals were aboard the Carrera, a 
speedboat that entered United States waters after leaving Cuba.122 The United States Coast 
Guard (“USCG”) sought to intercept the Carrera, resulting in a high-speed chase.123 The 
USCG ended the chase after firing several shotgun rounds into the Carrera’s engine. The 
speedboat came to a halt, resulting in Uralde’s wife fatally striking her head.124 Uralde 
sought suit against the United States under the SAA and PVA, alleging the United States was 
negligent in failing to provide adequate medical attention to his wife.  
                                                                    
117 Id. at 848. 
118 752 F. Supp. 350, 352 (D. Haw. 1990). 
119 Id. 
120 752 F. Supp. at 354. 
121  752 F. Supp. at 356; see also id. at 357 n.9 (“the fact that defendant manned, equipped, and maintained the 
KILA does not alter the conclusion that it used the KILA as a public vessel to conduct oceanographic research as 
contemplated by the charter agreement.”). 
122 614 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2010). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
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The court determined the SAA provided the proper remedy because the Carrera was not a 
public vessel under the PVA.125 “The SAA covers . . . . admiralty claims, including those 
‘simply involving public vessels’ . . . . [a]ccordingly, when Coast Guard personnel are 
negligent in performing functions other than those ‘in the operation of’ public vessels, the 
claims arising from those acts fall under the SAA.”126 The SAA provided subject-matter 
jurisdiction in the district court for Uralde’s claims to be heard.127  
                                                                    
125 Id. at 1288. 
126 Id. at 1286. 
127 614 F.3d at 1288.   
